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Judicial conceptions of prisoners' rights in Ireland: an emerging field
Dr Mary Rogan BL
mary.rogan@dit.ie
ERA, Strasbourg, November 6-7 2014
I am very grateful for the invitation to speak about the role of the Irish courts in
dealing with issues relating to detention and conditions of detention. I am particularly
glad that Irish experiences are being shared at this conference, as prison law and
prisoners’	
  rights jurisprudence are only beginning to develop into a field of their own
in Ireland.	
  
	
  
In this paper I will discuss four themes. The first concerns judicial discussions of
conditions of detention, secondly I will examine the development of the principles of
procedural fairness in decisions on the use of separation or isolation of prisoners. I
will then move to look at issues concerning foreign prisoners, and say a few words
about conditions of detention in the immigration context. Finally, I will explore some
of the barriers to a greater role for the Irish courts in the area of conditions of
detention. I will speak from the experiences drawn from my research, but also from
legal practice.	
  
	
  
The legal framework governing Irish prisons
There are 14 prisons in Ireland and just under 4,000 prisoners, translating to a rate of
about 96 per 100,000 population.1 This rate is now falling, after four decades of an
increasing prison population, and a particularly rapid increase during the last decade.
Overcrowding is a feature of many of our prisons.2 	
  
	
  

1

See further Rogan, Prison Policy in Ireland: Politics, Penal-Welfarism and Political
Imprisonment (New York, Routledge, 2011); Rogan, Prison Law (Dublin,
Bloomsbury Professional, 2014); www.iprt.ie.
2
The Irish Prison Service publishes a daily census of the prison population, including
details
of
occupancy
levels:
for
example
http://www.irishprisons.ie/images/dailynumbers/13_november_2014.pdf
1

The main legislative framework for conditions of imprisonment in Ireland is found in
the Prisons Act 2007, and the Prison Rules,3 a secondary piece of legislation, from the
same year. The Rules govern all aspects of prison life, including conditions, visits,
and correspondence. The rules do not confer directly justiciable rights, but are an
important source of guidance for courts assessing a claim by a prisoner that a
particular right has been infringed and contain important procedures which must be
followed in the disciplinary context and when isolating a prisoner from the rest of the
prison population, a point to which I will return. A small but recently rapidly growing
set of judicial decisions is also providing principles which should govern conditions
of detention under our written Constitution which dates from 1937. Under the
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, state bodies must perform their
functions in a manner compatible with the state’s obligations under the Convention
and courts must interpret domestic law in light of the Convention, insofar as is
possible. In practice, it must be said that the Convention has had a fairly muted impact
on judicial decision-making in the prison context, and indeed elsewhere. In the High
Court Hogan J in DF v Garda Commissioner (No 3)4 made his view clear that many
of the protections in the Convention are already in place under the Irish Constitution,
for example Article 3 of the Convention goes no further that the protection of the
person under Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution. Challenges to prison conditions
or aspects of detention take the form of applications to the High Court for release, for
judicial review, or in plenary proceedings alleging damages personal injuries and/or
seeking other relief, again, usually to the High Court. There is no special division of
our courts dealing with prison matters exclusively. There are, as yet, no cases
resulting in a judgment by the ECtHR on prison conditions in Ireland which may
surprise you, there is one on release procedures.5
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S.I. No. 252 of 2007, as amended.
[2014] IEHC 213.
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  Lynch	
  and	
  Whelan	
  v	
  Ireland,	
  application	
  nos	
  70495/10	
  and	
  74565/10,	
  June	
  18	
  
2013	
  and	
  July	
  8	
  2014.	
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Prison conditions
It is undoubtedly surprising that prison litigation has only emerged relatively recently
in Ireland in light of our problems with overcrowding and lack of in cell sanitation for
some prisoners.	
  
	
  
Two cases decided in the past few years have, however, have given a great deal of
guidance on what the Constitution requires regarding conditions of detention. First, it
is of note that prison conditions may be challenged using what is known as the Article
40 procedure. This means that a prisoner can apply for an inquiry into the lawfulness
of his or her detention, i.e a habeas corpus inquiry, and potentially obtain release on
the basis that the conditions in which he or she is being detained are so bad as to
amount to unlawful detention. This is an extremely interesting remedy, however, it
will not surprise you to hear that it is extremely difficult to obtain! Article 40 contains
the right to liberty, and Article 40.4.4 of the Constitution lays out the procedure
whereby a person seeks to obtain an inquiry into the lawfulness of his or her
detention, which requires the detainer to justify the detention. 	
  
	
  
The availability of the remedy of release in this context was established in the case of
The State (Richardson) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison.6 This case held that an order
for an inquiry into the legality of a prisoner’s detention on the basis of cell conditions
should only be granted in exceptional circumstances but. If a court considered that the
authorities were taking advantage of the fact that a person was detained consciously
and deliberately to violate his or her constitutional rights or to subject him or her to
inhuman or degrading treatment, the court might order release. Likewise, if the court
was convinced that the conditions of a person’s detention were such as to seriously
endanger his life or health, and that the authorities intended to do nothing to rectify
these conditions, the court might release him. The position would also be similar if
the conditions of a prisoner’s detention were such as to seriously threaten his life or
health, but the authorities were, for some reason, unable to rectify the conditions. 	
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[1980] ILRM 82.
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In Kinsella v Governor of Mountjoy Prison7 the applicant sought release under Article
40 in circumstances where he had been isolated from the rest of the prison population
because of fears for his safety. He was placed in an observation cell in the basement
of the prison. The cell was approximately three metres by three metres, was entirely
padded, and contained nothing other than a mattress. There was a small window
providing some natural light, and there was a dispute as to whether the shutter over
the window was working. The applicant also argued that he was provided with no
reading material and had access neither to a radio nor a television. Hogan J held that
the conditions had breached the prisoner’s right to bodily integrity, finding that the
detention amounted to a form of sensory deprivation. Hogan J held that the protection
in the Irish Constitution or the right to the person extended to the integrity of the
human mind and personality, and that prolonged detention in such circumstances gave
rise to the risk of obvious psychiatric disturbance. However, Hogan J refused to hold
that the prisoner was in unlawful detention. This was on the basis that the court
considered that the prison authorities had the best of intentions in housing the
applicant and had placed him in the cell at issue simply because of a lack of space
within the prison and to prevent threats on his life. In the view of the court, ‘absent
something akin to an intentional violation or manifest negligence on the part of the
authorities it would be only proper to given them a fair opportunity to remedy the
situation in light of the decision. The prisoner was transferred to another prison the
following day. Hogan J considered that ‘…	
  the present case may yet prove to be an
example of constructive engagement of this kind between the executive and judicial
branches which achieves a just solution in line with appropriate separation of powers
concerns without the immediate necessity for a coercive or even a declaratory court
order’.
	
  
In August of this year the Supreme Court was required to sit on an emergency basis to
discuss the appropriateness of invoking the Article 40 habeas corpus procedure in
circumstances concerning a challenge to rules on remission. The Supreme Court held
in Ryan v Governor of Midlands Prison8 that the remedy of release can be used only
in exceptional cases in the post-conviction setting, but implicitly recognised that cases
7
8

[2012] I IR 467. Hereinafter Kinsella.
[2014] IESC 54.
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where prison conditions were being challenged did fall within that exceptional
category. This was followed by the High Court in Burke v Governor of Cloverhill
Prison.9 	
  
	
  
Another application for an inquiry into the lawfulness of a prisoner’s detention arose
in the case of Connolly v Governor of Wheatfield Prison.10 In this case, the applicant
was detained for twenty three hours per day in his cell. He had requested to move to a
cell of single occupancy, being fearful of homophobic victimisation and requiring
protection from the general prison population. It was the view of the prison authorities
that his life was not in danger, but the prisoner refused to come off 23 hour lock up.
His cell had a bed, a counter, a toilet and sink, and a television. He had ready access
to reading material. He was not able to participate in any training or recreational
activities. However, he was detained in circumstances, which the court held were
approaching solitary confinement, for several months. Hogan J considered that every
detained person must be permitted some meaningful interaction with the human
faculties of sight, sound and speech, as such interaction is vital if the integrity of the
human personality is to be maintained. However, Hogan J also noted that the regime
had been imposed upon him at his own request and his circumstances were monitored
on a regular basis. The indefinite detention of a prisoner in these conditions for a
period of years would clearly violate the right to the person. However, for periods less
than that, and taking into account the very grave difficulties faced by those running
prisons, the detention was held not to be unlawful at that point. Hogan J returned to
the same theme developed in Kinsella, holding that ‘the judicial branch can but rarely
be prescriptive in terms of specific conditions, not least given that this is ultimately
the responsibility of the executive branch, and the Courts should confine themselves
to prompting, guiding and warning the executive branch, lest the precious values of
human dignity and the protection of the person might be violated’.	
  
	
  
It may also be of interest that the Irish High Court has held that a lack of in cell
sanitation requiring a prisoner to use a chamber pot for human waste and to empty
that pot with other prisoners into a sluice or drain was not inhuman or degrading
9

[2014] IEHC 449.
[2013] IEHC 334. Hereinafter Connolly.
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5

either under the Irish Constitution or under the Convention, in circumstances where
the prisoner was not sharing a cell and the conditions of detention were otherwise
good.11
	
  
Procedural fairness and decisions to isolate
The numbers of people on 23 hour lock up, or over 19 hours lock up, have been
decreasing over the past year or two in Ireland.12 However, the use of isolation has
given rise to a series of cases on the procedural protections necessary before a
decision to remove a prisoner from the rest of the prison population is made or to
confine them to his or her cell for very long periods without access to recreational or
educational services that other prisoners can use. We are aware of the concerns about
holding prisoners in isolation for anything over 15 days. Procedural fairness is
essential in the prison context in order to ensure that detention is legitimate and is
experienced as being legitimate. 	
  
	
  
The use of isolation is governed by the Prison Rules 2007. There are three main bases
upon which a prisoner can be put on isolation. These relate to grounds of order,
protection of the prisoner or other prisoners, and the need to use a special observation
cell. 	
  
	
  
Rule 62 governs the use of protection on the grounds of order, which I will focus on
here. There is a procedure under the Rules which requires, inter alia, that the
Governor of the prison must review the direction to isolate the prisoner not less than
once in every seven days, and inform the prisoner in writing of the reasons therefor,
either before the direction is given or immediately afterwards. Cases have arisen
emphasising the importance of adhering to these provisions. In Devoy v Governor of
Portlaoise Prison13 the applicant was placed in isolation, but rule 62 had not been
invoked. The court considered that the circumstances of the detention were such that
rule 62 could have been invoked and measures outside the Prison Rules should not be
11

Mulligan v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2010] IEHC 269. Hereinafter Mulligan.
See the census of restricted regime prisoners at
http://www.irishprisons.ie/images/monthlyinfonote/oct_restrict_2014.pdf.
13
[2009] IEHC 288.
12
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employed in the first instance, if the same result can be achieved by following the
Prison Rules. Rule 62 should have been used. However, the court also held that the
authorities were acting on their duty to protect life and it would be inappropriate to
quash the decision, though the illegality required immediate remedy. 	
  
	
  
In Dundon v Governor of Cloverhill Prison14 the applicant was subject to a regime,
the legal basis of which was in dispute. The prisoner argued that he was detained in
conditions which were, in effect, those envisaged by rule 62, but without invoking
rule 62. After the initiation of proceedings the authorities invoked rule 62. The High
Court held that a Governor may not restrict the normal life of a prisoner, as envisaged
by the Rules, without recourse to the provisions of the Rules. Whenever a restriction
on the prisoner’s ability to associate reaches the point at which rule 62 becomes
applicable, it should be invoked so that its notification and oversight provisions take
effect. 	
  
	
  
Foreign prisoners
Approximately 20% of the prison population in Ireland is from outside Ireland.
Ireland does not keep good data on the precise profile of where these prisoners are
from. 	
  
	
  
The Prison Rules require that an explanatory booklet outlining the entitlements,
obligations and privileges under the prison Rules should, insofar as is practicable, be
provided to a foreign national in a language that is understood by him or her, and if a
booklet is not available, all reasonable efforts must be made to ensure that the
contents are explained to the prisoner. A foreign prisoner must be provided with the
means to consult a consul and an applicant for asylum with the means to contact the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In Gan v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison15 the
court held that ‘a prisoner is entitled to seek to have special dietary needs and
requirements catered for in a reasonable and proper manner’. Under the Prison Rules

14

[2013] IEHC 608. See also Killeen v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2014] IEHC
77.
15
[2011] IEHC.
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(Amendment) 2013,16 if a complaint is made concerning racial abuse or
discrimination against a prisoner it must be subject to an investigation, oversight of
which is given to the Inspector of Prisons. 	
  
	
  
It is surprising that so little caselaw exists on the position of foreign prisoners in the
Irish system. The courts have held that a foreigner may be entitled to a reduced
sentence compared with an Irish national in light of the fact that a foreign prisoner
will have a much more difficult time within the Irish prison system DPP v
Whitehead.17 	
  
	
  
People can be committed to prison in Ireland for immigration related issues. In 2013
there were 374 people committed to prison for immigration issues, with a daily
average population in this category of 1318. Those who are awaiting deportation may
be held for a few days; prison may also be used for violations of immigration law
such as those involving visas.	
  
	
  
However, Ireland houses a much larger group of people in a system known as ‘direct
provision’, which has come in for very significant criticism in the last few years and is
now the subject of a review ordered by Government. Direct provision is used for
asylum seekers. Such individuals receive a weekly allowance of €19.10 per week per
adult and €9.60 per child. They are not entitled to any other social security payment
and cannot seek or enter employment, on pain of criminal sanction. As Liam
Thornton has written, it was introduced in April 2000. Asylum seekers are held in bed
and board accommodation provided by the Reception and Integration Agency in
hostels, guesthouses and holiday camps around Ireland. A case is currently before the
High Court challenging the use of direct provision, arguing that it has no statutory
basis and is therefore unlawful and challenging the lack of a complaints process
which is independent, the inability to chose the food one wishes, freedom of
movement and the interference with family life. A decision is awaited.19 The
16

S.I. No. 11 of 2013.
Court of Criminal Appeal October 20 2008.
18
Irish Prison Service, Annual Report 2013.
19
C.A. and T.A. (a minor) v Minister for Justice and Equality and others, record
number 2013 751 JR. A judgment is expected on November 14th 2014.
17
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Government has created a working group to review the use of the direct provision
system. The amount of time people spend in direct provision is the subject to
particular criticism (perhaps in the order of years). This system is entirely separate to
that run by the Irish Prison Service. 	
  
	
  
Those in asylum detention are becoming increasingly visible in Irish political and
public discourse, but there is much less in the way of discussion of those detained in
prison while awaiting deportation, perhaps because of the short periods of time
involved. 	
  
	
  
Why is prison law only now emerging in Ireland?
I want now to explore some of the reasons why the judiciary is only recently
developing a set of constitutional principles concerning the regulation of conditions of
detention. The first set of explanations is pragmatic –	
   prison law is not yet an
established area of legal practice in Ireland, though this is changing as training
opportunities increase.20	
  
	
  
There is no legal aid in Ireland for prison cases involving challenges to conditions or
decision-making by the prison authorities. There is a comprehensive scheme for
criminal cases and for challenges to the legality of detention based on irregularities.
However, prisoners challenging conditions do so on by means of lawyers acting on a
no foal no fee, or no costs no charge basis or, pro bono, and may face a substantial
legal bill. The lack of specialisation is a problem for both practitioners and judges,
with most prison cases coming from criminal defence firms, whose core expertise is
quite different.
	
  
There is also older caselaw in Ireland21 which suggests that a prisoner will not
succeed in establishing a breach of his or her rights unless he or she can prove ‘evil
intent’	
   on the part of the prison authorities (in direct contravention of the position
under Article 3 of the Convention) though the decision in Kinsella suggests that the
20	
  Prison	
  Law	
  is	
  now	
  offered	
  to	
  students	
  at	
  Dublin	
  Institute	
  of	
  Technology.	
  	
  
21

The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365.

9

judiciary is moving away from this position and that the question of the attitude of the
authorities is relevant to the remedy which will be ordered. 	
  
	
  
The courts have, rightly, emphasised the separation of powers in prison cases.
Deference to the position of a prison governor perhaps reached its height in the case
of Foy v Governor of Cloverhill Prison22 which concerned the use of screens during a
visit between a father and his son. The court held there that it was undesirable for a
court to interfere with the running of a prison and found the use of screens in all cases
in the remand prison to be reasonable, again in contrast to decisions under Article 8.
However, in Mulligan the High Court held that in an appropriate case a court in
Ireland may actually directly improvements in prison conditions where warranted to
vindicate a constitutional right, and where the vindication of such rights is not
constrained by boundaries such as practicability.	
  
	
  
Importantly, the Irish High Court has also noted the crucial role played by the courts
in vindicating rights within the context of detention. In Connolly v Governor of
Wheatfield Prison Hogan J held:	
  
	
  
While due and realistic recognition must be accorded by the judicial branch to
the difficulties inherent in the running of a complex prison system and the
detention of individuals, many of whom are difficult and even dangerous, for
its part the judicial branch must nevertheless exercise a supervisory function to
ensure that the essence of these core constitutional values and rights - the
dignity of the individual and the protection of the person - are not
compromised …	
  
	
  
The obligation to treat all with dignity appropriate to the human condition is
not dispensed with simply because those who claim that the essence of their
human dignity has been compromised happen to be prisoners. …	
  .23	
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[2012] 1 IR 37.
[2013] IEHC 334 Paragraphs 15-18. Internal citations omitted.
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With that uplifting statement about the role of the courts, I will finish. Thank you.	
  
	
  
	
  

11

